The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem? by Kriechel,Ben & Ziesemer,Thomas
 
 













  The Environmental Porter 
Hypothesis as a Technology 
Adoption Problem?  
 
Ben Kriechel & Thomas Ziesemer 
 


























MERIT – Maastricht Economic Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology 
 
PO Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
T: +31 43 3883875 







International Institute of Infonomics 
 
 
c/o Maastricht University 
PO Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
T: +31 43 388 3875 
F: +31 45 388 4905 
 
http://www.infonomics.nl 
e-mail: secr@infonomics.nl The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a
Technology Adoption Problem?
Ben Kriechel∗ & Thomas Ziesemer†
April 2003
Abstract
The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with
environmental standards may be partially or even fully oﬀset by adop-
tion of innovations they trigger. The timing of the adoption aspect
of the Porter Hypothesis has not been captured in formal theory so
far. We show in this paper how the Porter Hypothesis can be ap-
proached using a model of technology adoption. In the Reinganum-
Fudenberg-Tirole game of timing, a ﬁrm adopts earlier under stricter
environmental taxation, and under some circumstances can credibly
precommit to early adoption. We show that all times of adoption —
preemption, following and joint late adoption — are earlier the higher
the non-adoption tax. Under preemption the ﬁrm of the country that
varies environmental taxes will adopt ﬁrst with certainty indicating
increased competitiveness, but get lower proﬁts than without environ-
mental policy. Thus the Porter Hypothesis of increasing overall proﬁts
is rejected.
∗Maastricht University: ROA, Corresponding author
†Maastricht University: MERIT & Department of Economics
1The environmental Porter Hypothesis suggests (see Porter and van der
Linde, 1995) that the costs of compliance with environmental standards
may be partially or even fully oﬀset by innovations they trigger and this
may even lead to absolute advantages over foreign competitors. While the
general fear of trade economist was rather one of ecological dumping rather
than increased environmental regulation to improve competitiveness, the ar-
ticle was greeted with skepticism. Nevertheless, it led economists to think
seriously about the gist of the Porter Hypothesis: Is it possible that ﬁrms
could gain advantage over their foreign rivals through tougher environmental
regulation? While classical trade theory oﬀers no reason to believe in the
Porter Hypothesis, imperfect competition models were considered promising
to ﬁnd some theoretical foundations to the case study and anecdotal evidence
oﬀered by Porter and van der Linde.
Ulph (1996a) constructs a Brander-Spencer type of strategic trade model
with Cournot competition. Firms can invest in technology aﬀecting vari-
able costs but not the accompanying pollution. He shows that the strategic
interaction between producers reduces the government’s incentive to loosen
environmental regulation. He concludes, though, that the reduction of pollu-
tion with the lowering of the variable costs could change that result. This is
the avenue that Simpson and Bradford (1996) pick up. They model the ﬁrms
in a similar fashion, with the exception that R&D not only lowers marginal
costs, but also the emission of the pollutant. The government uses eﬄuent
taxation to maximize the domestics ﬁrm’s proﬁts net of the environmental
externalities of production. The government is able to force the ﬁrm into
a Stackelberg-leader position relative to its foreign competitor. For some
2special cases of speciﬁcations and numerical parameter values they are able
to construct a strengthening of regulation resulting in a shift of proﬁts from
foreign to domestic ﬁrms. However, they stress that this is not a general
result and it is unlikely, that environmental regulation should be used as a
policy device to induce industrial advantage.
Feess and Taistra (2001) model a two-period game with Cournot com-
petition. The environmentally friendly technology is assumed to lead to a
decrease of unit costs in the second period, however not in a way that re-
duces overall costs. Policy agencies of the foreign nation are assumed to
stochastically imitate the national environmental regulation.
Bertrand-type imperfect competition models were introduced in the con-
text of strategic environmental trade policy in the paper by Barrett (1994).
In the context of cost saving research Ulph (1996b) shows both for environ-
mental taxation and for environmental standards that ﬁrms can beneﬁt from
tighter regulation if only the governments act strategically, but ﬁrms do not.
Principal-agent models of the Porter Hypothesis are set in the context
of organizational ineﬃciencies. In this model type incentives between prin-
cipal and agent over the choice of projects are miss-aligned. Environmental
regulation helps to re-align the preferences of principal and agent, hence in-
creases the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm (see for example Schmutzler (2001) and
Klein and Rothfels (1999)). Ambec and Barla (2002) show that, by reducing
agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing
innovation while at the same time increasing ﬁrms’ private beneﬁt.
Other speciﬁcations are e.g. Mohr (2002): he uses a general equilibrium
framework with a large number of agents, external economies of scale in
3production, and discrete changes in technology. As new technologies are
modelled with an industry learning curve, ﬁrms are stuck in a non-innovating
equilibrium, initially. Environmental regulation enforces the adoption of ‘new
technology’, hence allowing for subsequent learning.
Related is H¨ ubner (2001). Using a duopoly model of a patent race, she
shows that stricter environmental policy might increase the probability of a
sleeping patent instead of encouraging environmental technological progress,
but the reversed case is also possible: environmental policy may activate
otherwise sleeping patents.
Empirical support for the Hypothesis is based on case study evidence (see
Ayres (1994) Porter and van der Linde (1995)). Palmer, Oates and Portney
(1995) provide empirical arguments explaining why full oﬀsets are rather un-
likely. They base their argument on information provided by entrepreneurs.
A problem with both of these types of information provision is that the costs
of innovation precede the returns and the returns are often stretched out
over decades. Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997) critically evaluate the Porter Hypoth-
esis, they attempt to empirically ‘test’ the Hypothesis, but ﬁnd no evidence
supporting it. This empirical evaluation is based on the link between the
stringency of environmental regulation and R&D, but not on adoption.
Our approach diﬀers from earlier approaches to capture the Porter Hy-
pothesis in that we explicitly model the timing choice of both the home and
foreign ﬁrm based on asymmetries in environmental taxation (regulation).
The timing of adoption aspect of the Porter Hypothesis has not been cap-
tured in formal theory so far. We try to make a ﬁrst attempt in this paper
using the model of technology adoption of Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg and
4Tirole (1985, 1987) and Tirole (1988, Chapter 10).
We will commence by using a pedagogic ‘basic model’ which emphasizes a
crucial point we want to make: environmental policy may destroy or shorten
an non-adoption equilibrium. It explains why it may be rational not to adopt,
although no opportunities are overlooked. In the second section we give a
proﬁt-maximizing version of the Porter problem using a Hotelling framework.
In the third section we use a model of a game of timing with a case of
higher environmental taxes creating precommitment and decreasing proﬁts
providing a model of the Porter Hypothesis and a case of low environmental
taxes creating the domestic ﬁrm’s preemption position, but leading to lower
proﬁts as well. Thus, the Porter Hypothesis is rejected in as far as the claim
is one of increasing overall proﬁts.
1 Basic Idea: Environmental Policy Destroy-
ing Non-Adoption Equilibria
In this ﬁrst part of the section we will only consider a duopoly case on a
national market. Thus we assume away the eﬀect of international competi-
tion and competitiveness to get expositional clarity. In a further step we will
then consider eﬀects of an international duopoly when ﬁrms face diﬀerent
national environmental regulation.
As in Tirole (1988, Chapter 10) we consider a process innovation that can
be adopted at some cost, C, which is constant over time. It is assumed that
1 < C < (1 + r)/r, where r is the per-period rate of interest. If none of two
5Table 1: Payoﬀ with old and new technology



















ﬁrms adopts, the ﬂow rent for both is Π > 1. If only one ﬁrm adopts it gets
Π+1 and the other gets Π−1. Thus, the innovation merely transfers proﬁts.
If both ﬁrms adopt they both receive Π again. The additional ﬂow proﬁt of
adoption when the other ﬁrm has already adopted is 1 > rC/(1 + r). The
interest on the adoption cost or net present value of the rent of adoption is
(1 + r)/r > C. Therefore an adopting ﬁrm whose action can be observed
immediately will be followed by the other ﬁrm. This makes adoption for
the ﬁrst ﬁrm, anticipating the second adoption, unproﬁtable. Because of the
perfect observation and reaction possibilities each ﬁrm can aﬀord to wait and
resist the temptation of adoption proﬁt, Π + 1, which will vanish immedi-
ately after the competitors adoption anyway. In a pay-oﬀ bi-matrix the net
present values of proﬁts from adopting new or sticking to old technologies
are summarized in Table 1.
Adoption of both is also an equilibrium but one with worse results than no
adoption because adoption is costly. As both ﬁrms have the old technology
in the beginning and both can anticipate that adoption would be followed
6Table 2: Payoﬀ with environmental taxes



















immediately by adoption of the competitor, ﬁrst adoption is self-damaging.
No adoption for both is therefore the superior equilibrium for the two ﬁrms
(See Tirole 1988 and Fudenberg and Tirole 1987).
Given that the new technology is not only more cost eﬃcient, but also
cleaner by assumption, the equilibrium is inferior from the consumers’ point
of view. “New/New” will only be an equilibrium if ﬁrms cannot observe
competitors action and therefore prefer to preempt. This case of imperfect
information will, however, not be considered here.
Next, suppose we have homogenous goods independent of the production
technology. However, the new technology produces the good without pollu-
tion while the old one is dirty. The government punishes non-adoption with
an environmental tax, T. Proﬁts and costs are unchanged otherwise. Then,
the pay-oﬀ bi-matrix changes into the one given in Table 2.
Clearly, if the environmental tax is high enough, it does not pay anymore
for the two ﬁrms to stay in the non-adoption equilibrium. Formally, if T >
C, adoption becomes proﬁtable even disregarding the action of the other
duopolist. Both adopt the new, clean technology. Without the tax, the
7Table 3: International case with unilateral taxes



















technology would never have been adopted (see Table 1).
Proposition 1.1 Suﬃciently high environmental taxes can force ﬁrms out
of a non-adoption equilibrium.
However, this argumentation so far falls short of the Porter Hypothesis
in the original, strong sense which (also) implies a competitive advantage for
the nation that introduces the environmental regulation. Let us assume free
trade, so there is no tariﬀ protection, and that the home country, believing
in the Porter Hypothesis introduces the environmental tax or regulation at
cost T. Firm 1 is located in ‘Home’, while ﬁrm 2 is located in ‘Foreign’,
competing on a third market without transport costs or tariﬀs. Foreign does
not introduce any regulation, hence the pay-out matrix looks like Table 3.
We will now derive the conditions the tax has to fulﬁll, in order to be
eﬀective, and also examine the eﬀect of the tax in terms of the Porter Hypoth-
esis. Firm 1 will adopt the new technology if the net pay-oﬀ from adopting
is higher than from non-adopting. Let us examine separately the cases for a
foreign ﬁrm 2 following adoption, and for a foreign ﬁrm 2 that will not adopt.
Let us assume for the moment that foreign ﬁrm 2 will not adopt at all, then
8the best strategy for ﬁrm 1 is to adopt if:








r on both sides yields
(1 + r)
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> C − T







For C < (1 + r)/r, as assumed above, this holds for any T ≥ 0. This last
condition states that the discounted cost minus tax should be smaller than
the discounted (inﬁnite) stream of future extra proﬁts of the new technology
(set to be equal to one in the Tirole set-up used here). However, the equation
above is derived under the condition that it is not proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2 to
adopt — after all that is the case of competitive advantage even if T = 0.
Thus the following condition should also be fulﬁlled. The foreign ﬁrm 2 will
not adopt as long as the costs of adoption are higher than regaining the
‘symmetric’ adoption equilibrium:













9This contradicts the basic assumption that
1 + r
r
> C > 1.
Hence, ﬁrm 2 will follow immediately.
Proposition 1.2 If only one country imposes an environmental tax, non-
adoption is no longer an equilibrium and both ﬁrms adopt the new technology
immediately. The home ﬁrm — in contrast to the Porter Hypothesis — has
no advantage.
We will show below in a proﬁt maximizing setting that this result is
modiﬁed if adoption is delayed because later adoption is cheaper.
2 An Application to the Hotelling model
The basic idea of the previous section can easily be carried out in the
Hotelling framework. In the model households are located on the unit inter-
val [0,1] and ﬁrm 1, located at zero, has market share x and ﬁrm 2, located
at point 1 of the interval, has market share 1−x. Household x has transport
cost xt if he buys from ﬁrm 1 and (1 − x)t if he buys from ﬁrm 2. He is
indiﬀerent between buying from any of the two ﬁrms if he has equal utility
net of costs from both. A ﬁrm that does innovate oﬀers additional utility
∆s. Indicating adoption by δ1,2 = 1 and non-adoption by δ1,2 = 0, equality
of costs net of additional utility of household x from buying from any of the
two ﬁrms can be written as follows:
p1 − δ1∆s + tx = p2 − δ2∆s + t(1 − x)
10Table 4: Payoﬀ matrix for Hotelling game: both ﬁrms taxed
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 − → new old




















2 − τ, t
2 − τ
Solving for x and (1 − x) respectively yields
x = [p2−p1+t−(δ2−δ1)∆s]/2t and 1−x = [p1−p2+t+(δ2−δ1)∆s]/2t
Taxes, τ, for non-adoption appear in a lump-sum fashion in the ﬂow of proﬁts
of the ﬁrms where c denotes constant unit costs:
Πi = (pi − c)[pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s + t] − (1 − δi)τ
Obviously, taxes do not appear in the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maxi-
mization of ﬁrms with respect to pi, and therefore they do not appear in the
reaction functions. Calculation of reaction functions, equilibrium prices and
proﬁts (see Tirole 1988, Chapter 7) yields ﬂows of proﬁts as summarized in
Table 4.
Comparing this pay-oﬀ matrix for ﬂow proﬁts with that of section 2 for
discounted present values shows that the relation between ﬂow and total
taxes is T = (1 + r)τ/r. If τ > rC(1 + r), it is clearly better for ﬁrms to
adopt.
Proposition 2.1 Firms adopt in the Hotelling framework if the environ-
mental tax τ is suﬃciently high, i.e. τ > rC(1 + r), which yields a higher
11Table 5: Payoﬀ matrix for Hotelling game: sales tax paid by producers
















It may be interesting to note that other tax measures can easily fail to give
an incentive for adoption. An exemption from a speciﬁc consumption tax
in case of adoption (δ1 = 1), for example, leads to the following indiﬀerence
condition for consumer x:
p1 + (1–δ1)τ − δ1∆s + tx = p2 + (1 − δ2)τ − δ2∆s + t(1 − x).
If both ﬁrms take the same decision, the tax term drops out in all follow-
ing steps of the analysis and therefore will have no impact on the diagonal
elements of the pay-oﬀ matrix. The tax exemption thus fails to provide an
incentive for adoption. Next, consider an exemption from a speciﬁc sales tax
paid by producers. The indiﬀerence condition is unaﬀected but proﬁts are
aﬀected. The deﬁnition of proﬁt becomes
Πi = [pi − (1 − δi)τ − c][pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s + t]
Successive calculation of ﬁrst-order conditions, reaction functions, equilib-
rium prices and proﬁts yields the ﬂow of proﬁts (gross of adoption costs)
given in Table 5.
Proposition 2.2 Exemptions from consumer taxes fail to provide an incen-
12tive for adoption. An exemption from speciﬁc sales taxes on producers has
an impact only in the cases of asymmetric adoption behaviour. However,
asymmetric adoption behaviour is not an equilibrium outcome.
Next, consider an ad valorem sales tax exemption for ﬁrms. Proﬁts are
redeﬁned to be
Πi = {pi[1 + (1 − δi)τ] − c}[pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s + t]
First-order conditions can be written as
[1 + (1 − δi)τ][pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s + t] − {pi[1 + (1 − δi)τ] − c} = 0
Dividing this equation by [1 + (1 − δi)τ] yields
[pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s + t] − {pi − c/[1 + (1 − δi)τ]} = 0
The production-cost term, c, did never appear in the pay-oﬀ matrix in all
the cases discussed so far. Therefore the tax term will also vanish with it
in this case if (non)-adoption behaviour is symmetric. This leads us to the
following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 Exemption from ad-valorem producer taxes do not aﬀect
the non-adoption equilibrium.
All of these examples from the Hotelling model conﬁrm a well known
lesson: a tax policy must approach the problem directly. The diﬀerence with
other tax and tariﬀ lessons is that the incentive eﬀect of x-best measures are
in many other cases not zero as they are here (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983).
Proposing indirect taxation measures for policy purposes then is tantamount
to supporting the decision of the ﬁrms to avoid adoption. Therefore the
deﬁnition of environmental policies which clariﬁes when a tax has to be paid
is crucial.
133 Environmental taxes in a game of timing
In the models of the previous sections ﬁrms either both adopt or not at all
even if only one country raises a tax. A less extreme distinction can be
considered in a model where ﬁrms either adopt earlier or later. Reinganum
(1981) and the extension by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) provide such a
model. Here we restate their model for the case of two ﬁrms and introduce
an environmental non-adoption tax, τ. We show that all times of adoption
— preemption, following and joint late adoption — are earlier the higher the
adoption tax. Moreover, a high environmental tax ensures a precommitment
position for the domestic ﬁrm but decreases proﬁts. A low environmental
tax ensures preemptive position of the domestic ﬁrm, also with lower proﬁts.
3.1 Games of Timing: National Case
Let π0(0) - τ denote after-tax proﬁts of a ﬁrm if no ﬁrm has yet adopted.
π0(1) - τ denotes after-tax proﬁts of a ﬁrm if only the other ﬁrm has adopted.
π1(1) is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm which has adopted but the other ﬁrm has not.
π1(2) is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm if both have adopted.1
There is a cost c(t) associated with adoption, where c is a function of
time such that early adoption is more costly ( c0 < 0). Using index 2 for
the ﬁrm that is second to adopt, the follower, and index 1 for the leader, the
value of the ﬁrms with adoption times T1 and T2 can be written as follows
(the ﬁrst T on the LHS denotes the ﬁrms own adoption time, the second the
other ﬁrms adoption time):
1The number in brackets is the number of ﬁrms that has adopted: 0, 1, or 2. The lower





























Firms only diﬀer in two aspects. First, in the second phase ﬁrm 1 has
adopted and ﬁrm 2 has not. Second, the present value of the cost of adop-
tion, c, at diﬀerent points in time are diﬀerent. Assumptions made on the
magnitude of the proﬁt and cost items are the following:
1. There are decreasing returns in the rank of adoption: π1(1) > π1(2).
2. The diﬀerence in proﬁts from adoption, at time zero, is not larger than
the decrease in the costs of adopting while waiting: π1(1)−[π0(1)−τ] ≤
−c0(0) for all τ ≥ 0. Therefore immediate adoption is not proﬁtable
unless the equality part of the equation holds.
3. Second adoption always becomes proﬁtable after some time:
inft{c(t)ert} < {π1(2) − [π0(1) − τ]}/r for all τ ≥ 0.
4. Current costs of adoption are falling but decreasingly so:
for all t, (c(t)ert)0 < 0, (c(t)ert)00 > 0.
15If there is a precommitment on the order of adoption, the optimal adop-
tion time for the leader, T1, can be found from the ﬁrst-order condition
dV
1/dT1 = [π0(0) − τ]e
−rT1 − π1(1)e
−rT1 − c
0(T1) = 0 (3.1)
The optimal adoption time for the follower in case of a precommitment can
be found from the ﬁrst-order condition
dV
2/dT2 = [π0(1) − τ]e
−rT2 − π1(2)e
−rT2 − c
0(T2) = 0. (3.2)
If the leader has already adopted, the second of the two equations deter-
mines the followers optimal time, T ∗
2, — with and without precommitment
— and allows us to calculate the impact of the environmental tax on the












The second equation has been obtained by insertion of c0 from equa-
tion 3.2. Assumption (4) implies that the denominator, which is also the
second-order condition of equation 3.2, has a negative sign.
The dependence of timing of the leader upon the environmental tax can












This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 The leader and the follower adopt earlier under precom-
mitment if the environmental tax is larger.
If there is no precommitment on the order of adoption, ﬁrms may be
interested in preemption. The timing of preemption can be found as follows.






2) if t < T ∗
2
V (t,t) if t ≥ T ∗
2






2,t) if t < T ∗
2
V (t,t) if t ≥ T ∗
2
If both ﬁrms adopt together the payoﬀ for each ﬁrm is M(T) = V (t,t).
If t < T ∗
2, L(t) > M(t) and F(t) > M(t). Using the above deﬁnitions as




0(T1) + [π0(1) − τ]e




00 < 0 (3.6)
because of assumption (4). As L(t) − F(t) has a maximum, each ﬁrm
would like to preempt the other. As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) ,
L(0) < F(0) from assumption (2) and L(T ∗
2) = F(T ∗
2) from the deﬁni-
tions of L and F and L(T ∗
1) > F(T ∗
1) from V 1(T ∗
1,T ∗
2) > V 2(T ∗
2,T ∗
1) un-
der precommitment. Together with the monotonicity of the value functions
this information implies that there must be a point in time, T1, at which
L(T1) = F(T1) (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985, p. 386). This is the ﬁrst
proﬁtable point in time for preemption. Equating the values of the ﬁrms,













Proposition 3.2 Under preemption, the timing of preemptive adoption will
be earlier if the environmental tax is higher.






−π1(1)e−rT1 + [π0(1) − τ]e−rT1 − c0(T1)
< 0.
Now suppose that there is joint late adoption and therefore












The optimal joint adoption time is found by maximization of M with respect
to T = T1 = T2. The ﬁrst order condition is
dM
dT




From this we can calculate the impact of an increase in the environmental





−r[π0(0) − τ]e−rT + rπ1(2)e−rT − c
00(T)
< 0
Proposition 3.3 Joint late adoption takes place earlier under a higher en-
vironmental tax.
3.2 Games of Timing: International Case
Now let us suppose that the environmental regulation is again one-sided.
The ﬁrms are located in diﬀerent countries and — as in section 1 — are
competing in a third market.
Table 6 summarizes the payoﬀ for the ﬁrms. Now π0(0)−τ are after-tax
proﬁts of the home ﬁrm and π0(0) for the foreign ﬁrm if no ﬁrm has yet
adopted. π0(1) − τ are after-tax proﬁts of the home ﬁrm if only the foreign
ﬁrm has adopted and π0(1) for the foreign ﬁrm. π1(1) is the proﬁt of the
home ﬁrm which has adopted but the other, foreign ﬁrm has not. π1(2) is
19Table 6: Payoﬀ in the game of timing
Foreign
lead follow
lead (Lh,Lf) (Lh,F f)
Home
follow (F h,Lf) (F h,F f)
the proﬁt of either ﬁrm if both have adopted. We use upper indices ‘h’ and
‘f’ for home and foreign respectively. Let us ﬁrst examine the case in which










































































2 ) = 0 (3.10)
We can see that T H
2 (r,τ) is independent of T1. Further,
∂TH
2
∂τ < 0. Hence we
can state that:
Proposition 3.4 Home, as the follower, adopts earlier if the environmental
20tax is larger, decreasing the time that a foreign ﬁrm can reap the beneﬁts of
early adoption.
Examining the impact of the environmental tax, τ, on the timing of the



















1 ) = 0 (3.11)
Hence, T
f
1 is independent of τ and T H
2 . The timing of foreign leadership is
not aﬀected by the tax τ imposed by the home government.

















































































2 ) = 0 (3.14)
Once more, the timing of the foreign ﬁrm’s adoption, here T
f









Figure 1: Timing of adoption under precommitment
of τ, but also of the timing of early adoption T h




because 3.10 and 3.14 diﬀer only by τ in 3.10.















1 ) = 0 (3.15)








1 because of 3.11 and 3.15.
Proposition 3.5 Foreign adopts slower — given that the environmental tax
is smaller or equal to zero — than the home ﬁrm both as leader and follower
Returns to Leadership and Following
We have shown above, that — under precommitment — home adopts earlier
than the foreign ﬁrm, both as a leader and as a follower. Hence, we can order
all timing of adoption in the following way: T h
1 < T
f
1 < T h
2 < T
f
2 , which is
also depicted in Figure 1.
22Table 7: Preferences of the Firm
Foreign
lead follow
Lh − F h > 0, Lh − F h > 0,
lead Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
Home
Lh − F h < 0, Lh − F h < 0,
follow Lf − F f > 0 Lf − F f < 0
We have to make sure, though, that the ﬁrms actually want to be leader or
follower. In order to examine this we have to examine the diﬀerence between
leadership returns L and follower returns F. Table 7 summarizes the payoﬀ,
which will be speciﬁed below. Home would like to lead if Lh − F h ≥ 0 and
follow otherwise. Subtracting the maximized value of 3.8 from 3.13 yields
(see Appendix):

















2 (τ)[π1(1) − π1(2)]e−rtdt −
￿
c(T ∗h





Home will try to preempt as long as L∗h − F ∗h > 0 and being the leader at
the preemption time T yields at least the same revenue as being a follower.
At this point the partial diﬀerential of equation 3.7 the ﬁrst proﬁtable time
























































[π0(0) − τ]e−rT h
1 − π1(1)e−rT h
1 − c0(Th
1 )
The denominator is greater than zero as Lh −F h = 0 is before (in time) the
maximum. We will evaluate the sign of the numerator by the parts indicated




















< 0 as T
h
1 > 0
has the economic interpretation that the environmental tax reduces the proﬁt
of leadership in the ﬁrst phase, and therefore the ﬁrst proﬁtable time of
adoption is later.

























> 0 as T
h
1 > 0
The tax reduces the follower proﬁt in the ﬁrst phase, the company has an
earlier ﬁrst proﬁtable time of adoption.
The 3rd, 5th and 6th term are all zero, as the Envelope Theorem applies
to F ∗h and therefore
∂Th∗
2




∂τ < 0, i.e. earlier pre-emption point of time for home with
higher environmental taxation. Hence, the taxation insures that the home
24ﬁrm always accepts earlier preemption times than foreign, because taxes
guarantee lower proﬁts as follower, and will thus win preemption games with
certainty (rather than with a 50 percent chance).
Proposition 3.6 A non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the ﬁrm
in that country can preempt earlier than the ﬁrm in the other country.
3.2.2 Joint late adoption
Another possibility is that both ﬁrms prefer to defer the investment in the
new technology, yielding a joint late adoption equilibrium: M(t) = V (t,t).











The value function for the home ﬁrm mirrors that of the foreign ﬁrm, with











The ﬁrst order conditions for c(t) are
∂Mf
∂ ˆ T1 = π0(0)e−r ˆ T1 − π1(2)e−r ˆ T1 − c0( ˆ T1) = 0
= (π0(0) − π1(2))e−r ˆ T1 − c0( ˆ T1) = 0
∂Mh
∂ ˆ T1 = (π0(0) − τ − π1(2))e−r ˆ T1 − c0( ˆ T1) = 0
This environmental tax destroys late adoption, as it leads to earlier adop-
25tion than the foreign ﬁrm, hence destroying the joint late adoption equilib-
rium.
Proposition 3.7 Even small taxes create a precommitment against (late)
joint adoption.
3.2.3 Returns to leadership
The change of ‘leadership returns’ with respect to the environmental tax, τ,
for home is evaluated below. Derivation with respect to T h
1 sum up to zero
when the envelop theorem is applied to Lh and those with respect to T h
2 when






















































A higher non-adoption tax increases the desire to lead, because it reduces
proﬁts from followership, F h, more than from leadership, Lh. Similarly, the
foreign ﬁrm would like to lead if Lf − F f ≥ 0.



















[π1(2) − π0(1)]e−rtdt − [c(T
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Now the eﬀect of the ‘home tax’ on foreigns willingness to lead (or follow),
is captured in the following derivative:






1 2 3 4 5 6                x(y)

















We cannot fully sign the derivative.2 Therefore we give a numeric simulation
in the next subsection.
3.3 Simulations
The cost function in this numerical simulations will be parameterized as
c(t) = 100 · e−αt. The assumption of c0 < 0 and c00 > 0 are then fulﬁlled
for all economically sensible parameter values of α ∈ R+. The parameter α
can be interpreted as one of technological advancement lowering the cost of
adoption over time.
We have parameterized the proﬁts after innovation using an additional
2A large π0(1) makes the desire to lead weaker, because it gives a higher weight to the
timing shift eﬀect. But a larger π2(1) has opposing eﬀects directly and from equation 3.3.
27Table 8: Simulation Parameters and Results
Case π0(1) π0(0) π1(2) π1(1) α r z · c Result
1 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.2 0.04 100c precommit
2 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 200c precommit
3 1.9 2 2 + x 3.1 + x 0.1 0.04 100c preempt or precommit
4 1.9 2 2 + x 2.2 + x 0.1 0.04 100c precommit
parameter x indicating the increase in proﬁts through the new technology,
denoting long-run advantage of the new technology. Note that this advantage
is lasting even after the follower has also adopted. For the diﬀerent parameter
values that we have tried, refer to Table 8. In case 3, we ﬁnd the possibilities
for preemption and precommitment. In the other case there is no case of
preemption because the short-run gain is too low. In the simulation that we
will discuss extensively in this section, case 3, we set the interest rate to be
r = 0.04, and the cost decrease of adopting the new technology over time
to be α = 0.1. The returns gross of adoption costs we assume are π0(1) =
1.9,π0(0) = 2,≤ π1(2) = 2 + x < π1(1) = 3.1 + x. In words, being a follower
decreases the proﬁts by ﬁve percent, whereas the (temporary) leader gains
more than ﬁfty percent in the short run plus some value x = π1(2) − π0(0)
gross of cost of adoption in the long run. This value of x remains after the
follower has caught up and also implemented the new technology. Setting x
to zero thus would indicate that — at least in terms of proﬁts — no advantage
of adoption would remain.
The timing of technology adoption can be calculated both for given (pre-
committed) leadership and followership according to equations (3.10, 3.11,
3.14, and 3.15). Figure 2 plots the timing of adoption for various levels of
x or y ≡ x + τ for foreign and home respectively. The inner line plots the
28timing given a ﬁrm’s precommmitment to leading, the outer line gives the
optimal time of adoption given precommitment to follow.
As this ﬁgure is based on precommitment, we have to show that ﬁrms
actually want to be leader or follower. If, for example, both ﬁrms would want
to lead, a game of preemption will occur in which earlier points of times are
chosen than those given in Figure 2. We will deal with preemption further
below.
In Figure 3 we plot L−F values for both home and foreign (cf. Equations
3.16 and 3.17) for various levels of x and y ≡ x + τ. L − F is the proﬁt
from leading minus proﬁts from following, hence as long as it is positive, a
ﬁrm will attempt to be the ﬁrst to adopt. The ﬁgure graphically illustrates
this situation for the home and foreign ﬁrm. The area in which the L − F
area is above zero home would like to lead. Areas that are overlapping
between those two ﬁgures indicate regions of pre-emption. Note that x has
the interpretation as above, i.e. continued gain in proﬁts through technology,
while y is deﬁned as the sum of x+τ. For the chosen parameter speciﬁcation
and cost functions, the 45 degree line of x = y, i.e. no environmental tax,
is an overlapping region in which both home and foreign would like to lead.
Hence, preemption would take place by each ﬁrm with ﬁfty percent chance
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1987). However, for large τ > 0, i.e. x < y = x+τ we
can see that both ﬁrms are pulled out of the preemption area and home will
be the leader (L − F is positive for the home ﬁrm) whereas foreign prefers
to follow (L − F is negative for the foreign ﬁrm). Only for small values of x
and τ will preemption take place.




























Proposition 3.8 If the short-term gain is large enough to allow for a pre-
emption case, low environmental taxes induce a preemption game which is
certainly won by home. High non-adoption taxes induce a precommitment
for home to be the leader.
In Figure 4 the “height” gives the ﬁrst proﬁtable time T of preemption.
Note that the points of time are decreasing for home with the y-axis while
they are decreasing for foreign along the x-axis. Preemption should result
with low τ and precommitment with high environmental taxes τ. In the
case of a preemption game, the lower x is (along the 45 degree line) and
the higher τ (moving parallel to the y-axis), within the preemption range,
the later will be the ﬁrst proﬁtable point of preemption for the foreign ﬁrm.
For home, higher environmental taxes lead to earlier proﬁtable points of
preemption. Hence, home will have an earlier proﬁtable preemption point
of time for any τ > 0, therefore, it will preempt just before foreign’s ﬁrst
proﬁtable point of preemption (which yields higher proﬁts than home’s ﬁrst



























proﬁtable point, and is suﬃcient to be the ﬁrst one to preempt). We can
then calculate the proﬁts of preemption as a function of x and τ. Increasing
τ leads to lower preemption proﬁts. Figure 5 summarizes the proﬁts of home
as a function of x and y = x + τ. The left ﬁgure gives the proﬁts as a
function of x and y = x + τ. Proﬁts are increasing along the 45 degree line
and an increase in τ will lower the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This implies that
environmental taxation does not lead to higher proﬁts of the ﬁrms in games
of preemption, contradicting the Porter Hypothesis. The reason is that the
earlier preemption opportunitiy of home is inﬂuenced by lower gains as a
follower which is induced by the environmental tax. The right part of Figure
5 gives the proﬁts under precommitment: For small values of x (and τ) an
increase in environmental taxation will lead to lower proﬁts. Under high
levels this is reversed. Only in this last case, the Porter Hypothesis would be
supported. However, these high values of y imply negative adoption times
and therefore have to be excluded, which one can show by cutting oﬀ the





























graph at the value of y at which there is immediate adoption.
Proposition 3.9 (Anti-Porter): Proﬁts under preemption are lower the larger
the non-adoption tax and proﬁts under precommitment are lower for higher
taxes.
For all other numerical values which do not violate the assumptions of the
model we found results that are qualitatively identical.
We have shown in this last section that environmental regulation can be
beneﬁcial in the strategic games of timing, to allow the home ﬁrm to lead
and avoid preemption. One should bear in mind that this numerical example
was contrived and is speciﬁc to the parameter values at hand. Many other
scenarios can be thought might be just as compelling. Nevertheless, we have
shown that environmental tax allows for a quicker adoption, and a longer
time of ‘leadership’ under precommitment and a shorter time of followership
in general. Proﬁts of the ﬁrm, however, are not higher: Higher taxes decrease
32the proﬁts in the ﬁrst phase of (3.13), induce a longer second phase (T
f
2 is
unaﬀected by τ) and a shorter ﬁrst phase and higher adoption costs. The
net eﬀect is negative.
Corollary 3.10 It follows from propositions 3.8 and 3.9 that in the case of
preemption a small tax leads to a small decrease in ex-post proﬁts but also to
an increase of the chance of pre-emption from 50% to 100%.
In essence we have constructed an example of the weak version of the
Porter Hypothesis, as ﬁrms – maximizing their proﬁts – are pulled out of
an equal chance preemption equilibrium in such a way that the ﬁrm con-
strained by the environmental regulation adopts earlier with certainty. Com-
petitiveness in the sense of winning a preemption game is enhanced. Non-
environmental as well as environmental welfare is enhanced for consumers of
home, as they get higher quality and cleaner products earlier.
4 Conclusion
Given the prominent role of innovation oﬀsets in the Porter Hypothesis we
did prefer to model it using a framework of technology adoption by Fudenberg
and Tirole in which non-adoption is an equilibrium outcome although ﬁrms
are proﬁt maximizing.
In the static version of the model we did show that a non-adoption equi-
librium can be destroyed by an environmental non-adoption tax. However,
as the foreign ﬁrm follows there is, in contrast to the Porter Hypothesis, no
advantage for the home ﬁrm . This result also holds in the Hotelling version
33of the static model. Moreover, we show that taxes not directly targeting the
non-adoption problem may fail to have an adoption incentive on the ﬁrms.
In a dynamic version of the model early adoption is more costly than
late adoption. By implication, immediate adoption cannot be expected and
an equilibrium with time periods where a new technology is not adopted by
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms is a rational outcome. In the national case, under
precommitment on the order of adoption, the leader and the follower adopt
earlier if the environmental tax is larger. Under preemption, the timing of
preemptive adoption will be earlier if the environmental tax is higher. Joint
late adoption takes place earlier under a higher environmental tax.
In the international case, the home country raises a tax but the foreign
country does not. Under precommitment on the order of adoption, if home is
the follower it adopts earlier if the environmental tax is larger, decreasing the
time that a foreign ﬁrm can reap the beneﬁts of early adoption. Comparing
behavior as follower, foreign adopts slower than home, because in foreign
there is no environmental tax by assumption. If there is a preemption game,
a non-adoption tax in one country ensures that the ﬁrm in that country can
preempt earlier than the ﬁrm in the other country. The home ﬁrm preempts
just before the foreign ﬁrm would do. The chance of preemption jumps
from 50/50 to 100% for the home country if there is an environmental tax.
The case of preemption will exist under a low environmental tax only if the
temporary gains of ﬁrst adoption are high relative to the temporary losses of
second adoption. Under high non-adoption taxes or low temporary gains and
losses there is a precommitment for home to be the leader. Ex-post proﬁts
of the home ﬁrm are lower under preemption and under precommitment
34the larger the tax is, in contrast to the Porter Hypothesis. In sum, a tax
introduces a reduction in ex-post proﬁts but also a jump from 50% to a 100%
chance of preemption. In this sense competitiveness is increased but proﬁts
are decreased.
35A Derivations of L-F function
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[π1(1) − π1(2)]e−rtdt −
h
c(Th
1 ) − c(Th
2 )
i
From (3.9) and (3.12) we get:
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